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Rochester expert on war termination applies possible scenarios to Russia鈥檚 invasion of Ukraine.

, a professor of political science at the , is an expert on international conflicts鈥攐n how they begin and end. Ultimately, he says, whether the war in Ukraine lasts weeks, months, or years, depends on individual actions that run the gamut from those of world leaders, to ordinary citizens and soldiers.

Take for example the Russian commander who apologized to the Ukrainian people for invading, telling them he had been duped by his own country鈥檚 misinformation. According to Goemans, it鈥檚 those single actions that can cause large-scale domino effects.

鈥淩emember, the soldiers are the ones doing the fighting and the dying. They have to agree to the terms of this war, because if they don鈥檛 agree, with guns in hand, they have options: they can continue fighting against the enemy, join the enemy, , or attempt regime change at home.鈥�

Soldiers are most likely to disobey orders when they recognize that a war will not achieve its objectives, or that they are fighting for their leaders鈥� survival and against their own interests, says Goemans, author of听听(Princeton University Press, 2000) and coauthor of听听(Cambridge University Press, 2011).

Goemans draws a direct parallel to the Russian soldiers in March 1917 who refused to fight any longer in World War I for a cause and the Tsarist regime they no longer believed in.

鈥淭hose were a series of individual decisions, which cascaded into a mass surrender and defection. Individual actions really matter, not just for leaders,鈥� he says.

Often, going to war is not just a calculation of a state鈥檚 national interest but also takes into account a leader鈥檚 predilections, beliefs, and preferences. In order to end a war, a leader鈥檚 chances of political and physical survival must be taken into calculation, says Goemans, who argues that an outright defeat in Ukraine may actually translate into a death sentence for Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Q&A with Hein Goemans

One or both sides must change their demands as a precursor to ending the war. What鈥檚 likely to happen in the current scenario?

• Putin made a big mistake by committing himself to total victory in Ukraine.

Goemans: It depends on the performance on the battlefield, and a country鈥檚 expectations of outside help. Russia should have become more pessimistic in the last few days because Ukraine has shown its ability to inflict far greater costs on Russia than the Kremlin had anticipated. One would expect Russia therefore to lower its demands but we鈥檝e seen very little evidence of that so far鈥攐nly the demand of denazification seems to have been dropped.

Overall, Putin still maintains that everything is going according to plan. If this continues, Ukrainian sovereignty may be at stake, which is dangerous and perhaps even stupid of Putin, who seems to be committing himself to total victory. If he can鈥檛 get it, he鈥檒l be responsible and that makes a coup against him more likely.

How has the situation changed for Ukraine and its demands for ending the war?

• Ukraine right now is not likely to accept anything less than full independence as a nation.

Goemans: Ukraine must have gotten a lot more optimistic in recent days. Not just because its army has been doing reasonably well but because of the demonstrated incompetence of the Russian army. Yes, the Russians are still much stronger and much bigger, but there are problems with morale in the Russian army, and you see the remarkable level of Ukrainian support from the West. Ukrainians are still fighting for independence of their homeland and may maintain their in the Donbas region in southeastern Ukraine. I don鈥檛 know whether they鈥檇 willing to give up Crimea at this point. One avenue worth exploring in peace negotiations might be true plebiscites, overseen by international observers.

Can Putin credibly commit not to go beyond the invasion of Ukraine?

• In his February 21 speech, he expressed his aim to reconstitute the Russian Empire.

Goemans: No, he cannot. Nobody would believe him if he said he鈥檇 stop at Ukraine. People are pointing to the failed attempt to appease Hitler with the . So that鈥檚 a non-starter, especially with in which he said he wants to reconstitute greater Russia or the Russian Empire. Western nations can no longer say, 鈥極h, he doesn’t mean that. We can still do business there and we can have gas if we give him just a little bit, maybe two Ukrainian towns or so.鈥� He made that impossible. Yes, the analogy is overused, but it really is like Hitler in 1938. People heard the speech and the appeasement alarm bells went off.

A deciding factor in this war is going to happen in the next couple of weeks. Can you explain the role of Russian conscripts in this context?

• The question is how many new conscripts will actually show up because it鈥檒l determine the strength of the Russian army on the ground in Ukraine.

Goemans: There are two things to keep in mind: First, the new Russian conscription class is going to be drafted in April. It鈥檒l be very informative to see how many people do not show up.

Secondly, are the Russians really going to bomb Kyiv, a so-called 鈥渉ero city of the Soviet Union,鈥� into rubble like they did with Chechnya鈥檚 capital ? Are they willing to kill tens of thousands of people? Those two benchmarks will happen in the next few weeks.

How precarious is the situation for Putin鈥檚 own survival?

• He may keep fighting, even if he knows he’s losing, because the alternative may mean signing his own death warrant.

Goemans: Putin may count on the fact that Ukrainians will give in if Kyiv is bombed. But if they don鈥檛, that should make him more pessimistic. One would think that he鈥檇 have to lower his demands, and that at that point, some kind of deal would be possible. But Putin must come home with some kind of victory because otherwise he鈥檚 literally dead. That means he may keep fighting, even if he knows he鈥檚 losing, because the alternative is signing his own death warrant. That鈥檚 what happened in the First World War. Germany kept fighting for years, even though the leadership knew that they were losing within the first weeks of the war.

You鈥檙e not hyperbolic when you say Putin is signing his own death warrant with a defeat?

• History has plenty of examples here.

Goemans: No, I’m not. In a regime like Russia鈥攚hich is clearly not a democracy, but also not quite a dictatorship鈥攊f you win a war, you’re the great hero; if you lose a war, you have shown your incompetence and you鈥檒l be removed, which I have explored . You鈥檒l be held as what鈥檚 known as a 鈥渃ulpable leader鈥濃�攃ulpable for the fact that the gains of the war do not outweigh the losses. Historically such leaders have been removed from office, and they either have gone into exile, or have been jailed or killed. A recent example is the former Yugoslav President . What鈥檚 frightening, and there are , is that Putin is moving towards a dictatorship because only full repression will prevent a coup against him. In that case, both the Russian and the Ukrainian people will suffer horribly.

What do you think would happen with the war if Putin鈥檚 regime were to be overthrown?

• 鈥淢ost likely, Ukraine would strengthen its demands and now want Crimea back.鈥�听

Goemans: It鈥檚 possible that the entire Russian superstructure would be wiped out鈥攏ot just Putin, but all his cronies, his security advisers, the oligarchs. That whole top layer could be removed. So the question is, if there鈥檚 a coup against Putin, what would the new Russian government insist on? They鈥檙e not necessarily all going to say, 鈥淥kay, sorry Ukraine, we made a mistake. Please excuse us.鈥� And Ukrainians would not necessarily accept that anyway. Most likely, Ukraine would strengthen its demands and want Crimea back.

Putin has said he wants to effect regime change in Ukraine鈥攚ould a new government even have any credibility with Ukrainians?

• Ukrainians have become unified against Russia.

Goemans: I don鈥檛 think so. There鈥檚 a new serious form of unity among the Ukrainian people and Ukrainian identity, and it鈥檚 in direct opposition to the Russians. It would be very dangerous for any Ukrainian government to be seen as colluding with Russia. Any such attempt would likely result in the formation of independent fighting units that would keep going to get the Russians out of Ukraine.

What are the minimum terms the West can accept?

• The West cannot accept Putin鈥檚 winning in Ukraine, but they might be willing to accept concessions on the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, if Ukraine is willing to entertain that.

Goemans: That鈥檚 an important question. The West鈥攖hat is Western Democracies鈥攃annot, in my opinion, accept a victorious Putin. The West is genuinely and correctly afraid of 鈥渟alami tactics鈥濃�攊f he takes Ukraine, he will next take Georgia, and then he will go to the Baltics. Annexation wouldn鈥檛 end, so it has to stop now. Particularly because Putin so unmistakably declared his intentions on February 21st.

Would the West accept Crimea as being Russian? I don’t know. Would the West accept Luhansk along the provincial administrative borders (which is not the same as the current line of control, which is currently roughly half of the of the provinces)? I doubt that. I think the West may demand a return to the . I don鈥檛 know if they can get that. Maybe Ukraine would have to give up the entire administrative region of Luhansk and Donetsk. But the West will want to go back to the status quo.

When do you think the war will end?

• Either in the next month and a half, or it鈥檒l be years.

Goemans: Either in the next month and a half, or it鈥檒l be years. Months, if the new class of Russian conscripts in April fails to turn up. Otherwise I鈥檓 not optimistic. It鈥檒l be ongoing bloodshed, pulverizing of Ukrainian cities, coupled with insurgencies, and Russia will never have full control of Ukraine.

But going back to the video of the captured Russian soldier who was ashamed of taking part in the invasion of Ukraine: If he returns to Russia, he鈥檒l most likely be killed. Yet, he鈥檚 speaking up and he鈥檚 hoping that he affects another guy, and then maybe two other guys, and it spreads like that. That鈥檚 how an army dissolves. On the other hand, that鈥檚 also how a Ukrainian army becomes more determined.